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[Vol. 38

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE - PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINAT(0N - DuTY To G1vE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION THAT No SIGNIFICANCE
SHOULD BE ATTACHED TO DEFENDANT's FAILURE TO TESTIFY - Defendant,
charged with conspiracy to import and sell narcotics, requested a special instruction that failure of defendant to take the witness stand does not create any
presumption against him. A federal statute specifically provides that no such presumption shall arise.1 The trial court refused the instruction, and after the
circuit court of appeals affirmed the conviction,2 the case was taken to the
United States Supreme Court. Held, the statute gave defendant a right upon
request to have such an instruction given. The error committed by its refusal
was not mere "technical error," but one affecting defendant's substantial rights. 8
Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 60 S. Ct. 198 (1939).
Statutes removing the common-law disability, and making the accused a
competent witness to testify, if he so desire, generally provide further that
failure to take the stand shall not create any presumption against him. The federal enactment in question is typical, and althou_gh slight variations in language

28 U. S. C. (1934), § 632.
(C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 921.
8 "On the hearing of any appeal, certiorari, or motion for a new trial, in any
case, civil or criminal, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the entire
record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions,
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." Judicial Code, § 269, 28
U. S. C. (1934), § 391. It is of interest to note that the Alabama court in a case
decided only a few months prior to the decision in the principal case held the refusal
of a similar instruction to be harmless error. Turner v. State, {Ala. App. 1939) 191
So. 392, cert. denied (Ala. 1939) 191 So. 396.
1

2

1940]

RECENT DECISIONS

are to be found among the state statutes, they are, with but few exceptions,
substantially the same. 4 The principal case is in accord with what may be called
the weight of authority, in so far as it imposes a duty on the trial judge to
instruct when properly requested that, from the failure of defendant to testify,
the jury shall draw no inference prejudicial to defendant. 5 The Supreme Court
had ample precedent not only in state decisions but in decisions of lower federal
courts. 6 Under the usual statute, it is not error to fail to give such an instruction
where defendant has not asked that it be given; 7 but two state legislaturesIndiana and Washington-have expressly provided that it shall be the duty of
the court to so instruct. 8 However, the Indiana court construed "duty" to mean
duty only when requested,° and although in Washington it was construed to
impose an absolute duty on the judge irrespective of request, this requirement
has been abrogated by the Washington Supreme Court under its rule-making
power, and at present the duty is conditioned on a proper request by the accused. 10
Objections have often been raised to the court's charging on its own motion
that the jury is not to draw any unfavorable inferences from defendant's silence.
Under the typical statute these objections are without merit and have been
quite readily and almost summarily overruled.11 A lower federal court has
4 Courts do not distinguish between statutes as to whether they use the word
"presumption" or "inference." The federal statute involved in the instant case states:
"And his failure to make such request shall not create any presumption against him."
28 U. S. C. (1934), § 632 (italics added). Several state statutes use these identical
italicized words: Mass. Laws Ann. (1933), c. 233, § 20 (3); Ark. Stat. Dig. (Pope,
1937.), § 3957. Slight variations may be found in other statutes: "Nor shall any
reference be made to, nor any comment upon, such neglect or refusal," Neb. Comp.
Stat. (1929), c. 29-2011; "cannot an any manner prejudice him, nor be used against
him on the trial or proceedings," Ariz. Rev. Code (Struckmeyer 1928), § 5179; "shall
not be taken as evidence of his guilt," Me. Rev. Stat. (1930), c. 146, § 19. Also
see infra, note 13.
~ State v. Wells, 53 S. D. 446, 221 N. W. 56 (1928); Cox v. State, 173 Ark.
1115, 295 S. W. 29 (1927); P!,ople v. Greben, 352 Ill. 582, 186 N. E. 162 (1933);
State v. McLung, 104 W. Va. 330, 140 S. E. 55 (1927). Contra: Kinney v. State,
36 Wyo. 466, 256 P. 1040 (1927), under a statute providing that no reference shall
be made to, nor shall any comment be made on, refusal to testify. In State v. Long, 3 24
Mo. 205, 22 S. W. (2d) 809 (1929), the Missouri Court held refusal proper because
of a statute providing that no instruction shall be given commenting on testimony.
6
Hersch v. United States, (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) 68 F. (2d) 799; Stout v. United
States, (C. C. A. 8th, 1915) 227 F. 799. But see statement contra in Swenzel v.
United States, (C. C. A. 2d, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 280, decided in the same circuit as
the principal case.
7
People v. Flynn, 73 Cal. 511, 15 P. 102 (1887); Matthews v. People, 6 Colo.
App. 456, 41 P. 839 (1895); People v. Warner, 104 Mich. 337, 62 N. W. 405
(1895).
8 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, I 93 3), § 9-1603; Wash. Rev. Stat. (Remington, 193 2),
§ 2148.
0
Grubb v. State, 117 Ind. 277, 20 N. E. 257,725 (1889).
10
State v. Mayer, 154 Wash. 667, 283 P. 195 (1929); State v. Comer, 176
Wash. 257, 28 P. (2d) 1027 (1934).
.
11
State v. Comer, 176 Wash. 257, 28 P. (2d) 1027 (1934), the court saying,
176 Wash. at 270: "It being necessary for the court to give such instruction when
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indicated that it is better practice not to giv:e an unrequested instruction on
defendant's failure to testify, but that if given it will not be reversible error
unless, under the circumstances of that particular case, defendant was prejudiced
thereby. 12 Under some peculiarly worded statutes, the trial court is prohibited
from in any manner instructing the jury concerning defendant's failure to testify, and it is, therefore, quite proper to refuse the proffered instruction.13 In
California, because of a specific constitutional provision allowing comment on
failure to take the witness stand, it is no longer error to refuse to give such
an instruction.14 The privilege against self-incrimin.ation has been at times so
meticulously scutinized, in favor of defendant, that for a judge to give an
instruction deviating from the language chosen by the legislature may be erroneous.15 Much criticism has been levelled at the approach taken by the courts
towards securing the accused's rights at the expense of effective crime enforcement.16 But whatever be the policy for limiting the privilege granted, while a
statute such as the one in the principal case is on the statute books, the one for
whose benefit it was enacted is clearly entitled to invoke it. To be given a right
or privilege is to be able to exercise that right or privilege; otherwise the statute
granting it is but a meaningless and empty gesture.

requested by the accused, it is difficult to see how it is error for the court to give it
when not requested." Eubank v. State, 104 Tex. Cr. 628, 286 S. W. 234 (1926);
Helms v. State, II2 Tex. Cr. 203, 17 S. W. (2d) 813 (1929); People v. Russo, 85
Cal. App. 672, 259 P. 1020 (1927).
12 Kahn v. United States, (C. C. A. 6th, 1927) 20 F. (2d) 782.
13 Kinney v. State, 36 Wyo. 466, 256 P. 1040 (1927), statute providing that no
reference shall be made to, nor shall any comment be made upon such neglect or refusal;
Mason v. State, 53 Okla. Cr. 76, 7 P. (2d) 492 (1932), statute saying that failure
to testify shall not ''be mentioned on the trial."
14 Following the earlier example of an Ohio amendment (Ohio Constitution,
Bill of Rights, art. I, § IO), the amendment to the California Constitution (Bill of
Rights, art. I, § 13) authorized comment on defendant's failure to testify. The California court has held that to give the instruction would nullify this amendment. People
v. Dukes, 16 Cal. App. (2d) 105, 60 P. (2d) 197 (1936).
15 State v. Shannon, 135 Me. 325, 196 A. 636 (1938); People v. Manning,
278 N. Y. 40, 15 N. E. (2d) 181 (1938); People v. Fitzgerald, 156 N. Y. 253, 50
N. E. 846 (1898), the court saying 156 N. Y. at 266: "it can never be necessary to
add anything to the plain and simple language of the statute on this subject. • •. and
the force of the proposition should not be weakened and destroyed with the jury by
qualifying words."
16 Bruce, "The Right to Comment on the Failure of the Defendant to Testify,"
3 1 M1cH. L. REV. 226 ( l 93 2) ; Carman, "A Plea for Withdrawal of Constitutional
Privilege from the Criminal," 22 MINN. L. REV. 200 (1938); Rapacz, "Limiting the
Plea of Self-Incrimination," 20 GEORGETOWN L. REv. 329 (1932).

